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STATUTES: 
ldaho Code Section 12-121 
RULES: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of Case 
This appeal arises from a divorce action filed by Susan Montoya, henceforth called 
"Susan" in this document, against Marvin Montoya, henceforth called "Marvin" in this 
document. Prior to trial, the parties were able to settle all issues regarding the entry of the 
divorce, the proper allocation of property and debts, and custody of, and visitation with, 
their two children. The only issues tried to the magistrate were (1) the amount of Marvin's 
income for child support purposes, (2) whether Marvin should pay a portion of Susan's 
attorney fees related to child custody and support, and (3) whether Marvin should pay all 
of the fees of the court-appointed expert, Tim Collias, who assisted the parties in reaching 
..their agreement regarding custody and visitation.=lngeneral terms, this appeal arises from 
the first two of those issues. 
II. Course of Proceedings Below 
Susan filed her complaint for divorce on February 7, 2006. R, pp. 12-16. In the 
complaint, she sought primary physical custody of the parties' two children and child 
support calculated in accordance with the Idaho Child Support Guidelines. R, pp. 13-14. 
Marvin answered the complaint on February 21, 2006, also seeking primary physical 
custody and child support. R, pp. 17-23. Many motions were filed in the course of the 
pretrial proceedings. R, pp. 3-1 1. 
The case went to trial on September 12, 2006. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
parties waived oral argument in favor of written closing presentations to be completed by 
October 31, 2006. Tr., p. 190, L. 4 through p. 191, L. 18. After listening to the evidence 
and considering the written arguments of the parties, the magistrate entered, on December 
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7, 2006, his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in which he fixed Marvin's 
annual gross income pursuant to the ldaho Child Support Guidelines at $140,339, ordered 
Marvin to pay monthly child support of $1,311.50, held that Susan had sufficient resources 
to pay her own attorney fees, and decided that Susan's claim that Marvin should pay the 
fees of the court appointed expert was premature. See R., pp. 36-51. The Final Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce was entered pursuant to the Magistrate's opinion on January 10, 
2007. See R., pp. 52-62. As matters turned out, Susan did not pursue the issue of the 
expert's fees after the entry of the judgment and decree of divorce. 
On February 8, 2007, Susan appealed the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
asserting that the magistrate erred by "ignoring and/or misconstruing" evidence presented 
at trial in determining the p-arties' respective income for purposes of child-support and by 
"failing to carefully review" Marvin's income and expenses from the operation of his 
business. R., pp. 63-66. She also argued that she was entitled to attorney fees on both 
the trial and appellate levels. R., p. 71. Marvin made a claim for attorney fees on appeal 
under ldaho Code Section 12-121, asserting that Susan's appeal amounted only to a 
request that the appellate court second-guess the findings of the magistrate. 
On December 6, 2007, the District Court, Senior Judge D. Duff McKee presiding, 
entered a Memorandum Decision in which he vacated the magistrate's findings of fact on 
account of his perception that the magistrate had failed to make a complete analysis of the 
evidence pertaining to Marvin's income and to make appropriate findings. R., pp. 67-71. 
This appeal followed. 
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Ill. Statement of Facts 
Because the primary issue in this appeal is whetherthe magistrate made a complete 
and accurate analysis of the evidence, it is necessary to discuss the evidence before him 
in some detail. Hence, the approach of this statement of facts. 
In the pretrial proceedings, Susan testified by affidavit filed on March 24,2006, that 
Marvin was 59 years old and "was too old to raise and parent children", that he was "not 
an involved parent", and that it was "not in the children's best interest for [Marvin] to have 
overnight visitation because the children are not verywell bonded with him, do not do well 
during his more lengthy care periods, because he cannot really parent alone (requiring his 
older sons to help him) and because he doesn't understand the children's needs." See 
Exhibit I, as identified in the Order Granting Motion to Augment Clerk's Re~ord~henceforth 
called "the Order". She also testified by affidavit filed on May 18, 2006, that Marvin was 
applying "extortion-like pressure" in the course of settlement negotiations, that it would be 
"traumatic" for the children to be away from her overnight, and that it would be "very 
unhealthy and traumatic" for the children to take a vacation with Marvin to visit his parents 
in New Mexico unless she were to go along with them on the trip. She further testified by 
affidavit filed on May 19,2006, that Marvin "was rarely involved in [the children's] care" and 
that he had filed a motion to retake possession of a house that was his separate property 
for "no purpose" and that it was "not in [her] children's best interest to have litigation . . . 
by Marvin seeking overnight visitation or visitation outside the State of Idaho with his 
parents." Emphasis added. In that same affidavit, she claimed that "much of the litigation 
[was] caused by Marvin's anger because [she] was divorcing him", that Marvin was not 
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"making very good decisions and is driven by his own rejection and selfish behavior", and 
- 
that Marvin was simply out "to punish [her]". See Exhibit 3, as identified in the Order. 
Susan opened her case at trial on September 12,2006, by introducing into evidence 
various exhibits that showed Marvin's income between 2003 and 2005 to have ranged from 
$273,871 to $376,427. Tr., p. 25, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 22. See, Exhibits 2, 29,48 and 49. She 
then testified to Marvin's previous estimate that his income for 2006 would be only 
$120,000. Tr., p. 27, L. 25 - p. 28, L. 8. She continued by asserting that Marvin and 
Fernando Veloz, the comptroller of MS Administrative Services, Inc., a company owned 
by Marvin, had explained in deposition testimony that Marvin was no longer taking 
commissions as income because he was using them to pay rent to one of his companies. 
Tr., p 28, LL. 9-24. See Tr., p. I1 0, L. 25 - p 11 1, L. 25. The rent at issue, she explained, 
was being paid for space in a building owned by Marvin. Tr., p. 29, LL. 2-9. She then 
testified to a financial statement, Exhibit 52A, that showed Marvin's income in 2005 to be 
around $398,000. Tr., p. 29, L. 10 - p. 30, L. 6. 
Susan continued by explaining that Marvin had told her that he received income 
from two companies: MS Administrative Services, which received income through 
administrative fees for processing insurance claims, and MST Insurance Agency, which 
received commission income from the sale of various insurance policies. MS 
Administrative Services paid Marvin a salary and MST paid Marvin commissions. See Tr., 
p. 30, L. 12 - p. 31, L. 19. By reference to Exhibit 19, the parties' tax returns for 2005, 
Susan identified commission income to Marvin of $165,296 during that year and asserted 
that, to her knowledge, Marvin still received that income. See Tr., p. 31, L. 13 - p. 32, L. 
4. By reference to Exhibit 4, Susan identified Marvin's salary from MS Administrative 
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Services to be $109,000. See Tr., p. 32, LL. 8-12. To the commissions and salary, Susan 
added gasoline reimbursement and vehicle lease payments of $5,100 and $9,552, 
respectively, to obtain total income to Marvin of $289,028. Tr., p. 32, L. 16 - p. 33, L. 12. 
See Exhibit 4. This was characterized by Susan as Marvin's income based on his 2005 
tax return. See Tr., p. 33, LL. 14-18. Susan testified that her income was $93,000 per 
year. SeeTr. ,p.32,L.25-~.33,L.  18. 
Susan then testified to Exhibit 65, which qhowed Marvin's income for 2005 to have 
been $294,558 and projected his income for 2006 at $126,415, including commissions 
already received in 2006 from Blue Cross, United Heritage and Delta Dental of $17,335. 
Tr., p. 35, LL. 1-11. See Exhibit 65. She attributed the difference to the exclusion of 
Marvin's commission income from the calculations. Tr., p. 35, LL. 12-14; She thought that 
the commission income should still be included in the determination of Marvin's income. 
Tr., p. 35, LL. 15-17. 
Turning to the issue of attorney fees, Susan explained that she received $66,000 
from Marvin by way of a real property settlement and that she spent all of that money in 
buying a new home. See Tr., p. 36, L. 21 - p. 37, L. 13. She testified to two retirement 
accounts that she owned that totaled $93,552, Tr., p. 37, L. 14 - p. 38, L. 17, but which 
were not readily available to her because of withdrawal penalties. Tr., p. 38, L. 23 - p. 39, 
L. 4. She then testified to $9,000 of assets in horses and a trailer and to other assets of 
household goods and a vehicle in which she claimed to have no equity. Tr., p. 39, LL. 5- 
16. Marvin, she said, had a net worth of $3,854,000. Tr., p. 39, LL. 17-21. 
Susan claimed not to be able to pay her attorney fees and testified that she would 
have to sell off assets to do so. Tr., p. 39, L. 22 - p. 40, L. 4. She therefore asked for an 
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award of attorney fees to cover the custody and child support portion of the case. Tr., p. 
- 
40, LL. 5-8. The total fee that she had incurred was $19,178 as of August 31, 2006, 
including the fees owed to Collias, but not including her attorney's work through September 
12, 2006. Tr., p. 40, L. 9 - p. 41, L. 3. See Exhibit 10. 
Susan claimed that Marvin had greater resources, assets and debts and that she 
could not pay her regular monthly bills on her income of $93,000 per year. Tr., p. 41, L. 
20 - p. 41, L. f 0. Not even an increase in child support of up to $2,600 per month would 
enable her to catch up her attorney fees, she claimed, because she had debts associated 
with the purchases of appliances and landscaping associated with getting into her new 
home and costs associated with raising the parties' children. Tr., p. 42, L. 11 - p. 43, L. 1. 
Marvin, Susan claimed, had caused herto incur unnecessaryfees by making false 
accusations such as using drugs, by asking for time to take a vacation in New Mexico with 
his parents and by asking for a mental examination by Dr. Craig Beaver. Tr., p. 43, LL. 2- 
21. In affidavits, she said, he had compared her to Andrea Yates, a mother who killed her 
children, and to Susan Smith. See Tr., p. 43, L. 22 - p. 44, L. I .  He further increased her 
attorney fees, she asserted, by claiming that his income had fallen in the course of the 
case. Tr., p. 44, LL. 6-15. At the end of her direct examination, she testified that Mawin 
had testified in his deposition on August 23, 2005, that she was a good mother. Tr., p. 44, 
LL. 16-23. 
On cross-examination, Susan admitted that Marvin's testimony describing her as 
a good mother was given after Tim Collias had completed his parenting evaluation and 
after the results of the mental evaluation had been disclosed and agreed that this was a 
step in the right direction toward effective co-parenting. Tr., p. 45, LL. 8-22. She refused, 
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however, to admit that Marvin's testimony was made in good faith. Tr., p. 45, LL. 19-22. 
She conceded that she had stipulated to pay one-half of the fees charged by Tim Collias 
and to the mental examination by Dr. Beaver. See Tr., p. 45, L. 23 - p. 46, L. 3. 
Susan then admitted to a base salary of $86,500, a bonus of $8,000, and to another 
$5,000 of benefits that were not reportable as income on a W-2. Tr., p. 46, LL. 4-21. She 
claimed that, with this income, she was unable to meet her reasonable needs, but admitted 
that she was not economically disadvantaged. Tr., p. 46, L. 22 - p. 47, L. 2. She further 
admitted that the disparity in assets visa vis Marvin was due to a premarital agreement 
that she had executed before he married her. Tr., p. 47, LL. 3-12. 
Susan explained that the landscaping costs to which she had previously testified 
amounted to $3,00O,.that the money spent on new appliances amounted to $6,000, and 
that the furniture expense was $8,000. Tr., p. 47, LL. 12-19. She denied that she had 
done anything to present Marvin in an unfavorable light in the course of the action and 
claimed to havetold the truth about everything throughout the course of the entire litigation. 
Tr., p. 48, LL. 2-7. 
Her knowledge of the structure of Marvin's business was certain, Susan said, 
because of constant conversations about that subject in 2005. Tr., p. 48, LL. 11-20. 
These discussions had focused upon the possibility of her taking control of Mawin's 
company, thus becoming an integral part of the operation. Tr., p. 48, L. 21 - p. 49, L. 7. 
In a continuation of the cross-examination, Susan admitted that, as part of the 
property settlement, she had received a vehicle that was worth $27,000, free and clear of 
any debt, Tr., p. 50, LL. 4-7, and jewelry valued at $11,000. Tr.,p. 50, LL. 8-13. 
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Susan admitted to having a master'sdegree. Tr., p. 50, LL. 14-1 5. She agreed that 
Marvin's income had historically fluctuated up and down. Tr., p. 50, LL. 16-20. She further 
admitted, after some prodding, to a scheduled consult for plastic surgery later in 
September of 2006 (the trial date was September 12, 2006) that was not medically 
necessary. Tr., p. 50, L. 21 - p. 51, L. 24. 
On redirect examination, Susan testified that she had sold the vehicle that she had 
received in the property settlement to pay bills associated with her new home. Tr., p. 52, 
L. 17 - p. 53, L. 1. She then stated that she was employed as the director of administration 
for Hawley Troxell, a law firm in Boise. Tr., p. 53, LL. 2-6. 
Susan's next witness was Jerry Doman, who testified to a conversation in which he 
alleged that Marvin told him in colorful metaphorical terms that he wanted to bankrupt 
Susan. Tr., p. 55, LL. 3-20. On cross-examination, Doman admitted that the Hawley 
Troxell account that had been administered by MS Administrative Services (one of Marvin's 
companies) was in the process of transferring to Smith's Administrators and that he would 
benefit financially from the change. Tr., p. 60, LL. 9-24. On redirect examination, Doman 
testified that Marvin had told him that, although their business dealings would continue, 
their friendship was over, because of the report by Doman to Susan concerning the threat 
of bankruptcy. Tr., p. 63, L. 14 - p. 64, L. 18. 
Susan's last witnesswas Marvin. She opened her examination by having him testify 
that, in 2005, he had completed a financial statement in which he had projected his income 
for that year to be $398,000. See Exhibit 52A. He then testified that his actual income had 
proven to be much less as a result of the divorce action. He explained that, pursuant to 
a plan that would have brought Susan into his company, more than doubling the size of the 
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company on that account, he had invested his financial resources into a building to provide 
space for the anticipated expansion. When Susan filed for divorce, he still had this new 
building and debt that had to be paid on that account. Hence, the reduction in his personal 
income. Tr., p. 67, L. 25 - p. 68, L. 25. 
Marvin then testified that his actual income for 2005 had been $273,871. Tr., p. 70, 
LL. 10-19. He then asserted that his salary from MS Administrative Services in 2006 would 
be $109,080. Tr., p. 70, LL. 20-22. He would have, he explained, no income from MST, 
because his commission income was being paid to a company called Montoya Enterprises 
for rent of the building in which his companies were located. Tr., p. 71, L. 8 - p.72, L.7 
Marvin denied making the colorful remark attributed to him by Doman. Tr., p. 72, 
LL. 8-18; p. 74, LL. 4-9. He explained his failure to retract the statement by stating that he 
had never made it. Tr., p. 72, LL. 19-24. He testified that he was angry with Doman, 
because Doman admitted sharing information obtained from Marvin with Susan, Tr., p. 73, 
LL. 6-17, and because Doman was playing one party against the other for his own financial 
gain. Tr., p. 74, LL. 10-14. 
On cross examination, Marvin testified to 2006 financials showing a net worth of 
$1,975,900. Tr., p. 74, L. 23 - p. 75, L. 7. See Exhibit 223. He explained the reduction 
in net worth from that stated in the financials for 2005 by describing (1) how his assets had 
ben depleted by the investment of cash into the building and from the property settlement 
with Susan; (2) how his liabilities had been increased on account of the building project 
(that debt, in fact, exceeded the actual value of the building); and (3) how his total income 
had declined when Susan's income was no longer added to his own. Tr., p. 75, L. 8 - p 
76, L. 22. 
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His income was down, Marvin explained, because paying the debt on the building 
was consuming the funds that he had formerly received as personal income. Tr., p. 76, 
L. 7 - p. 77, L. 22. In addition, he had lost the business represented by Hawley Troxell's 
account, with a net annual loss of income between $70,000 and $80,000. Tr., p. 77, L. 23 
- p. 78, L. 13. He had also lost two other accounts, J.D. Lumber and Treasure Valley 
Heating & Cooling, apparently because they received better quotes elsewhere. The 
Treasure Valley account alone was lost income of $700 per month ($8,400 per year). Tr., 
p. 78, L. 14 - p. 79, L. 14 
Marvin testified that he was borrowing money to pay his attorney fees. Tr., p. 82, 
LL. 12-19. Susan, he said, had understated the assets that she took out of the house, 
including furniture, exercise equipment, dishes, food and "play money". Tr., p. 82, L. 23- 
p. 83, L. 23. 
Marvin estimated that his total income in 2006 would be around $136,000. Tr., p. 
83, L. 24 - p. 84, L. 2. He explained the difference between that estimate and the numbers 
described by Susan as the result of lost business and Susan's use of outdated historical 
data that did not reflect present reality. Tr., p. 84, LL. 3-16. 
Marvin explained that he had given personal guarantees of the debts incurred by 
Montoya Enterprises, MS Administrative Services and MST Insurance and that he was, 
therefore, personally responsible for seeing that the debts were paid. Accordingly, all of 
the debt had to be paid before he could take any income. This was the way he had run his 
business for 25 years. Tr., p. 84, L. 16 - p. 85, L. 19. 
After the break for lunch, Marvin projected his income for 2006 at $135,932, 
including his salary from MS Administrative Services of $1 09,080, projected commissions 
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from independent companies of $22,598, and automobile allowances totaling $4,253. Tr., 
p. 86, L. 7 - p. 87, L. 2. He asserted Susan's income to be $98,000 per year, differing from 
her projection of $93,000 on account of a profit sharing distribution of $5,000. Tr., p. 87, 
LL. 3-7. 
Marvin then testified that his three companies (Montoya Enterprises, MS 
Administrative Services and MST Insurance) were jointly responsible for paying the debts 
on the building. Servicing that debt consumed all of the commission income earned'by 
MST, and there was no commission income left for distribution to Marvin. The receipt of 
commissions in the past, Marvin testified, was no guarantee that he would continue to do 
so in the future. Tr., p. 88, LL. 4-21. 
Marvin continued his testimony by explaining that he had borrowed the $66,000 that 
he had paid to Susan as a part of the property settlement and that he was paying 
8 114% interest per year on that debt. Tr., p. 88, L. 22 - p. 89, L. 5. He further testified that 
his corporate reserve for business purposes had been reduced from $250,000 to $80,000 
and that his personal reserve of $90,000 had been totally consumed. Tr., p. 89, L. 6 - p. 
90. L. 4. 
He then testified that Susan had, in the course of the divorce proceeding, attacked 
his credibility as a father and as a person. He had been forced to fight for visitation with 
his children. When the magistrate had ordered Susan to vacate the family residence (Tr., 
p. 16, LL. 8-15), Susan had retaliated by withdrawing all settlement offers on visitation. Tr., 
p. 90, L. 19 - p., 91, L. 22. He had, throughout the divorce, been willing to accept the 
recommendations of professionals who had evaluated the best interests of the children. 
Tr., p. 92, LL. 6-23. 
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Marvin testified that he had never accused Susan of being a bad mother and 
explained that he could tell from the behavior of his children that she was, in fact, a good 
mother. Tr., p. 93, L. 13 - p. 94, L. 8. He was satisfied that his other concerns had been 
evaluated and resolved. Tr., p. 94, LL. 9-17. 
Marvin concluded his testimony by describing his net worth at $1,400,000 rather 
than the $4,000,000 attributed to him by Susan. Tr., p. 94, L. 18 - p. 95, L. 21. He then 
objected to paying any of Susan's costs and attorney fees incurred in the divorce. Tr., p. 
95, LL. 22-25. 
On redirect, Marvin testified that a financial statement from which he had testified 
on direct, Exhibit 223, overstated his commission income by $8,000. Tr., p. 96, LL. 8-23. 
He testified,-consistent with the financials, that he personally received no rental income 
from his building, because that was paid to Montoya Enterprises. Tr., p. 97, L. 3 - p. 98, 
L. 2. Marvin did not know how much rental income Montoya Enterprises actually received, 
but estimated the monthly mortgage payment paid by Montoya Enterprises to be $17,000. 
Tr., p. 98, L. 12-p.  100, L. 9. 
The loss of the Hawley Troxell and J.D. Lumber accounts, Marvin testified, cost him 
about $120,000 per year. Tr., p. 100, LL. 18-23. He had not found any replacement 
clients, but was continuing to market. Tr., p. 103, L. 18 - p. 104, L. I. He had paid a total 
of around $44,500 of costs and attorney fees in the course of the divorce through the trial 
and did not know how much he then owed. Tr., p. 101, L. 2 - p. 102, L. 9. 
Susan's counsel closely questioned Marvin about the reasons for the decline in his 
commission income from MST, and Marvin reiterated that, in anticipation of the new 
business venture with Susan, he had invested heavily into a building to house that 
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company and his other businesses. When Susan filed for divorce, he was left with all of 
the debt on the building. Tr., p. 104, LL. 7-15. Servicing the debt consumed all of the 
commissions paid to MST that he would otherwise have received as commission income. 
Tr.,p. 104,LL.22-p. 105, L.5. 
Susan's counsel then questioned Marvin about the reserves to which he had 
testified previously, and Marvin reiterated that his business working capital had been 
reduced from $250,000 to $80,000 and that his personal reserves had been totally 
exhausted. Tr., p. 105, LL. 21 - p. 106, L. 1. 
Marvin acknowledged that, when the parties had first separated, he believed that 
Susan was acting in an unusual manner and that he had then been concerned about the 
safety of his children. Tr., p. 107, LL. 9-23. . 
On "re-something", Tr., p. 108, L. 1, Marvin testified that, in the simplest of terms, 
his income had gone down and his expenses had gone up from where they had been 
historically. Tr., p. 108, L. 25 - p. 109, L. 2. 
At this point, Susan rested her case, and Marvin opened his defense by calling 
Fernando Veloz, the comptroller of MS Administrative Services, as his first witness. Tr., 
p. 110, LL. 10 - p. 11 1, L. 25. Veloz explained the structure of Marvin's companies by 
noting that MS Administrative Services set up and administered health plans for employers 
within the state of Idaho. MST was an insurance agency that sold insurance, working in 
conjunction with MS Administrative Services. Montoya Enterprises, he said, owned the 
building that housed the other two companies. Tr., p. 112, LL. 4-22. MST and MS 
Administrative Services guaranteed the debt incurred by Montoya Enterprises, and Marvin 
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guaranteed all of the liabilities incurred by all of the companies. Tr., p. 112, L. 23 - p. 113, 
L. 11. 
Veloz then testified to a number of financial statements: 
1. Exhibit 21 5, an interim statement of revenue and expense, which showed the 
net income obtained by MS Administrative Services of administration of client 
health plans in the partial fiscal year starting in September of 2005, through 
July of 2006, to be $13,469.97. Tr., p. 114, LL. 7-23; 
2. Exhibit 216, a balance sheet showing Marvin's net equity in MS 
Administrative Services to be $68,490.20, Tr., p. 117, LL. 7-25; 
3. Exhibit 217, an interim statement of revenue and expense for December of 
, . 2005, through July of 2006, showing net income to MST during that time of 
$77,177.08. The statement showed commission expenses of $247,397.82, 
all of which was paid to outside brokers, and none of which was paid to 
Marvin. Tr., p. 118, L. 9 - p. 120, L. 22; 
4. Exhibit 218, a balance sheet showing Marvin's equity in MST lnsurance 
Agency to be $78,283.02. Tr., p. 121, LL. 3-18; 
5. Exhibit 219, a profit and loss statement for Montoya Enterprises, LLC, 
showing that company's income from January through July of 2006, to be 
$185,275.25, obtained for the most part from MS Administrative Services 
and MST Insurance, which were paying monthly rent of $20,000 with the 
balance coming from other tenants. Tr., p. 121, L. 21 - p. 122, L. 23. He 
further testified to monthly expenses of $1 8,000 for servicing the debt on the 
building plus $800 per month on a debt for purchase of a lot. Tr., p. 122. L. 
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24 - p. 123, L. 9. While these numbers apparently should total $18,800 per 
month, Veloz testified to a combined total of $1 8,600 per month. Tr., p. 123, 
LL. 12-23 
6. Exhibit 220, a balance sheet for Montoya Enterprises as of July 31, 2006, 
showing Marvin's equity in that company to be $477,532.25. This document 
showed the land and building to be the primary assets of the company. Tr., 
p. 123, L. 20 - p. 124, L. 19. The document shows paid-in capital by Marvin 
of $457,276.12, which was the 20% down payment that he had to make on 
the land and building to obtain a loan for the remaining 80% of the cost of 
those properties. This down payment had been funded, at least in part, by 
the commissions that had previously been paid to Marvin by MST lnsurance 
Agency. Tr., p. 124, L. 20 - p. 125, L. 7. 
After running through those exhibits, Veloz confirmed that Marvin would receive no 
commission income from MST lnsurance Agency during 2006, because the commission 
income received by MST was being paid through MS Administrative Services to Montoya 
Enterprises to service the debt on the building. Tr., p. 126, L. 6 - p. 127, L. 7. This was 
necessary, because the debt on the new building was costing $14,000 per month more 
than the rent on the old office space used by Marvin's companies ($20,000 - $6,000 = 
$14,000). Between them, MST lnsurance Agency and MS Administrative Services were 
providing, in the form of rent, funds to Montoya Enterprises that were, in turn, used by 
Montoya Enterprises to pay the debt on the building. Tr., p. 127, LL. 8 - 17. 
Veloz then explained how Marvin had come to purchase the building, testifying that, 
as a part of the management team for Marvin's companies, he had participated in 
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discussionswith Marvin and Susan overa three-year period in which plans had been made 
to expand the operation of those companies by adding a human resources consultation 
firm and by making Susan the CEO of both MST lnsurance Agency and MS Administrative 
Services. Veloz had projected that adding Susan to the companies would actually double 
the volume of their revenues. To accommodate the anticipated growth of his companies, 
Marvin bought land and built the building. Tr., p. 127, L. 5 - p. 131, L. 4. 
in response to questions by the court, Veloz testified that the construction loan had 
been converted to a term loan in June of 2005, when Marvin's companies took possession 
of the building. When that happened, Marvin had no tenants in the lower story of the 
building, which Marvin's companies were not then using. Because there were no tenants 
in the lower floor to help pay the expense, MS Administrative Services and MST lnsurance .,, 
Agency had to pay the full cost of servicing the debt. Tr., p. 131, L. 22 - p. 133, L. 19. 
Veloz explained that, to pay the debt on the building, Marvin had to forego 
commission income that he had previously received from MST lnsurance Agency. The 
income received by that company was channeled through MS Administrative Services to 
Montoya Enterprises, which was the entity that actually paid the debt on the building. Tr., 
~ . 1 3 3 , L . 2 5 - ~ . 1 3 5 , L . l l .  
In response to an objection by Susan's counsel that the debt on the building was 
Marvin's personal obligation, Tr., p. 135. L. 24 - p. 136, L. 5, Veloz explained that, while 
Marvin had personally guaranteed the obligations of his companies, the debt was, in the 
first instance, the obligation of Montoya Enterprises. To keep the corporation going, it was 
necessary to service the debt. Tr., p. 136, L. 15 - p. 137, L. 13. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 16 
Veloz then testified to the loss of two clients, a trucking company and the Hawley 
Troxell law firm, that would cost MS Administrative Services and MST lnsurance Agency 
about $9,000 per month in lost revenue. Tr., p. 137, L. 14 - p. 138, L. 15. 
Marvin was paid, Veloz testified, a salary of $9,090 per month by MS Administrative 
Services and no commissions from MST lnsurance Agency. Tr., p. 139, LL. 11-20. The 
companies could not, at that time, increase Marvin's income without depriving themselves 
of the means of paying the debt on the building. Increasing Marvin's salary, said Veloz, 
would bankrupt the companies. Tr., p. 139, L. 21 - p. 140, L. 20; p. 143, LL. 14-24. 
Moreover, Veloz explained, if Marvin took the income from his companies (thus rendering 
them incapable of paying the debt), the result would be that Marvin would have to secure 
individual financing and pay the debt himself. Tr.,.p. 139, L. 21 - p. 140, L. 20. 
Veloz concluded his direct examination by testifying that his financial analysis 
followed generally accepted accounting principles. Tr., p. 143, L. 25 - p. 144, L. 3. 
On cross-examination, Veloz testified from tax returns to income to MS 
Administrative Services in 2002 of $1,579,887, in 2003 of $1,598,150, in 2004 of 
$1,535,718, and in 2005 (through 11 months) of $1,700,742. Projecting the 2005 income 
through the last month, would result in a greater income. Tr., p. 144, L. 21 - p. 147, L. 11. 
While MS Administrative Services was currently receiving the same gross revenues that 
it had received historically, the company was now obligated to pay rent of $20,000 per 
month that did not show up on the tax returns for earlier years. Tr., p. 147, LL. 12-20. 
Marvin, Veloz said, did not personally receive rental income. Tr., p. 147, L. 21 - p. 
148, L. 12. The monthly rent of $20,000 to which he had previously testified was for the 
entire building. That rent had to be paid by Marvin's companies because they had no 
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tenants. Tr., p. 148, LL. 16-21. The rent on the top floor alone of the building was about 
$14,000 per month. Tr., p. 148, LL. 22-25. 
In theory, Veloz testified, MS Administrative Services would collect $6,000 per 
month of rent on the lower floor from other tenants. However, because that space had not 
been leased out, MS had to subsidize Montoya Enterprises by paying that $6,000 on top 
of the $14,000 for the space that it was actually using. Tr., p. 149, LL 11-18. 
Veloz further testified that, regardless of what Marvin had received by way of 
commission income from MST Insurance Agency in the past, the company did not have 
the capacity to pay him in 2006. To assert that Marvin was receiving commission income 
from MST lnsurance Agency was not true. Marvin's companies had to cover their 
operating expenses, which included the rent on the building. And, to assert that the rental 
expense was tied to the commission income or expense was not true. Tr., p. 152, L. 17 - 
p. 154, L. 2. Veloz continued by explaining that MST lnsurance Agency and MS 
Administrative Services had to sell services back and forth in the form of administrative 
expenses to enable both corporations to pay their bills. Tr., p. 154, L. 3 - p. 155, 1. 2. 
Veloz continued his testimony on cross-examination by stating that a balance sheet 
for MS Administrative Services, Exhibit 216, reflected actual costs without adjustment to 
reflect fair market value of the assets or goodwill. He also pointed out that the retained 
earnings of approximately $54,000 were not a cash equivalent, but instead showed the 
value of investments into various assets, including a web hosting company. Tr., p. 156, 
LL. 1-15. He then testified to Exhibit 217, a statement of revenue and expenses for MST 
lnsurance Agency for eight months from December 1,2005, through July 31,2006 (a count 
of the months shows the actual testimony that this is seven months to be a mistake), 
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showing commission income of $216,716 for that period of time. Tr., p. 156, L. 16 - p. 157, 
L. 6. None of that money was paid to Marvin. Tr., p. 157, LL. 7-10. It was true, said Veloz, 
that MS Administrative Services received $14,000 per month from MST lnsurance Agency, 
Tr., p. 158, L. 9 - p. 159, L. 6. The monies not paid to MS were the working capital reserve 
to which Marvin had testified. Tr., p. 159, LL. 7-25. 
Exhibit 219, a profit and loss statement for Montoya Enterprises, showed that this 
company collected $185,275 from MS Administrative Services and MST lnsurance Agency 
during the seven months from January through July of 2006. The expenses paid out 
against that sum consisted of interest, commissions, taxes and other costs. Tr., p. 160, 
LL. 1-21. When Susan's counsel attempted to describe the assets shown on Exhibit 219 
as.personal to Marvin, Veloz testified repeatedly that the building was owned by Montoya 
~ 
Enterprises. Tr., p. 162, LL. 2-16; p. 167, L. 19 - p. 168, L. 2. Marvin "owned" the building, 
said Veloz, only in the sense that he guaranteed the debt on the building, along with MS 
Administrative Services and MST lnsurance and that he owned the corporation that owned 
the building. Tr., p. 160, L. 22 - p. 162, L. 8. The corporations, continued Veloz, actually 
paid the debt on the building. If they did not do so, Marvin would be liable for the 
deficiency pursuant to his personal guarantee. Tr., p. 163, LL. 6-20; p. 165, L. I 8  - p. 166, 
L. 12. The equity on the asset, testified Veloz, went up as the balance on the loan went 
down. Tr., p. 164, LL. 6-1 9. 
Payments on the loan, testified Veloz, did not include the property taxes, which were 
handled separately. Tr., p. 164, L. 24 - p. 165, L. 4. In addition, Montoya Enterprises paid 
maintenance costs out of the $20,000 per month that it received as rent. Tr., p. 165, LL. 
5-10. From Januarythrough July of 2006, Montoya Enterprises had generated $19,958.45 
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over and above the expenses incurred in operating the building during that period of time. 
Tr., p. 165. LL. 11-16. See Exhibit 219. Marvin's equity in Montoya Enterprises was about 
$500,000. Tr., p. 167, LL. 4-7. See Exhibit 220. 
On redirect examination, Veloz reiterated that Montoya Enterprises owned the 
building and that Marvin had guaranteed the debt of that company. Tr., p. 167, L. 19 - p. 
168, L. 2. Montoya Enterprises had net income of $19,958.45 over the seven month 
period ending on July 31, 2006, after all expenses had been paid. Tr., p. 168, LL. 3-19. 
Under questioning from the magistrate, Veloz testified that Montoya was the sole 
shareholder, officer and director of MST lnsurance Agency, Inc. Tr., p. 170, LL. 10-14. 
While he could theoretically take for himself the $77,171 of net income of MST, he would, 
by doing so, jeopardize the financial integrity- of the companies by compromising their 
ability to pay the loan on the building. Tr., p. 170, L. 15 - p. 171, L. 9. MS Administrative 
Services was not, on account of its loss of clients, generating enough income to pay the 
loan on an ongoing basis. Similarly, MST lnsurance Agency would soon be losing the 
commissions that it had been earning on the lost accounts. Therefore, the corporations 
were saving their present income in anticipation of the financial crunch resulting from a loss 
of income over the next year. Tr., p. 171, LL. 10-25. 
The last witness at trial was Douglas Roberts, a self-employed C.P.A. who prepared 
Marvin's personal and business tax returns. Tr., p. 173, L. 14 - p. 174, L. 4. Roberts 
testified that he had reviewed the financial statements prepared by Veloz and that he saw 
no change of methodology in the preparation of the reports or the payment of taxes. Tr., 
p. 174, L. 10 - p. 175, L. 17. Roberts testified that Marvin's personal tax return for 2005 
included the net rental income of $975 earned by Montoya Enterprises during that year. 
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Tr., p. 177, L. 9 - p. 178, L. 17. The rent itself was paid by MS Administrative Services. 
Tr., p. 178, LL. 18-12. Marvin's personal tax returns reflect both the income to, and 
expenses incurred by, Montoya Enterprises. As expenses increase, Marvin's income 
decreases in the absence of a corresponding increase in revenue. Tr., p. 179, LL. 4-20. 
The methodology used in preparing Marvin's tax returns was consistent over the years and 
was also consistent with IRS regulations and generally accepted accounting principles. Tr., 
p. 179, L. 21 - p. 180, L. 5. 
Roberts further testified that, in the case of closely held corporations, the cash 
needs of the companies dictated what the owner could take as income for himself. 
Historically, from Roberts' perspective, Marvin had been careful to provide for the future 
in deciding what funds he could draw from his companies. Tr., p. 180, L. 17 - p. 181, L. 
8. 
Placing the building in the name of Montoya Enterprises was a tax strategy on which 
Marvin had decided in 2003, to allow himself a better opportunity to depreciate the building 
and to take money out of the company in good years without having to pay self- 
employment, social security or medicare taxes. These tax benefits, however, had no effect 
on the flow of the cash through the company. Tr., p. 181, L. 9 - p. 182, L. 21. 
On cross-examination, Susan elicited testimony from Roberts to the effect that 
Marvin took a deduction, through his companies, of $8,740 of business vehicle expense. 
Tr., p. 183, LL. 3-20. She also established that the rental income to Montoya Enterprises 
would be $240,000 in 2006. Tr., p. 184, L. 18 - p. 185, L. 7. Montoya Enterprises will, 
Roberts said, be able to depreciate the building over a period of 39 years. Tr., p. 185, L. 
8 - p. 186, L. 15. In the course of 2005, Montoya Enterprises had reimbursed MS 
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Administrative Services for $60,000 of expenses properly chargeable to the former 
company. Tr., p. 187, L. I - p. 188, L. 8. 
On redirect, Roberts testified that the increased rental income to Montoya 
Enterprises for 2006 would be offset by increased expenses reflecting the full year of 
activity that will be recorded in the tax returns. Tr., p. 188, L. 20 - p. 189, p. 9, 
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. What is the role of the Memorandum Decision of the' district court in this 
appeal? 
2. Was the magistrate's award of child support a manifest abuse of discretion? 
3. Did the magistrate consider all of the evidence before him? 
4. Was Susan entitled to attorney fees? 
5. Marvin claims attorney fees in this appeal pursuant to ldaho Code Section 
12-121 and ldaho Appellate Rule 41. Is he entitled to them? 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Memorandum Decision of the 
District Court is Advisory Only 
When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity over 
a magistrate court, the Supreme Court reviews the magistrate's decision independently of, 
but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. Swanson v. 
Swanson, 134 ldaho 512, 5 P.3d 973 (2000). The district court's opinion is valued for its 
insight, see Sato v. Schossberger, 117 ldaho 771, 792 P.2d 336 (1990), is considered to 
be instructive, Swope v. Swope, 122 ldaho 296, 834 P.2d 298 (1992), and is entitled to 
serious consideration. Matter of Hanson, 121 ldaho 507, 826 P.2d 468 (1992). However, 
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in the final analysis, it is not entitled to any deference. State ex rel. Industrial Commission 
V. Bible Missionary Church, 138 ldaho 847,70 P.3d 685 (2003); Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 
123 ldaho 464, 849 P.2d 925 (1993). All of which is to say that the district court's opinion 
is advisory only 
11. The Magistrate's Award of Child Support Was 
Not an Abuse of Discretion 
In the course of its review, the Supreme Court considers the record before the 
magistrate independently of the district court's determination. Howard v. Cornell, 134 
ldaho 403, 3 P.3d 528 (2000). The Supreme Court will review the magistrate's award of 
child support under an abuse of discretion standard. Browning v. Browning, 136 ldaho 
691,39 P 3d 631 (2001); Aguiarv. Aguiar, 142 ldaho 331,127 P. 3d 234 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The party challenging an award has the burden of establtshing that the magistrate's 
calculation constituted a manifest abuse of discretion. Henderson v. Smith, 128 ldaho444, 
915 P. 2d 6 (1996); Ross v. Ross, 103 ldaho 406, 648 P. 2d 11 19 (1982). A magistrate 
will be found to have abused his discretion in awarding child support only if he failed to give 
consideration to relevant factual circumstances, or if his finding are not supported by the 
evidence. See Rohrv. Rohr, 128 ldaho 137, 91 1 P. 2d 133 (1996); Margairaz v. Siegel, 
137 ldaho 556, 50 P. 3d 1051 (Ct. App. 2002). The magistrate's findings are supported 
by the evidence if the evidence on which he relies is substantial and competent. Peasley 
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 ldaho 732, 979 P.2d 605 (1999); Ireland v. Ireland, 
123 ldaho 955, 855 P.2d 40 (1993). For purposes of appellate review, findings are 
competent, so long as they are supported by substantial, albeit possibly conflicting 
evidence. Roe v. Roe 142 ldaho 174, 125 P.3d 530 (2005). Evidence is "substantial" if 
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a reasonable trier of fact could accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed 
point of fact had been proven. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352,48 P.3d 
In this case, the magistrate heard historical evidence from Susan detailing what 
Marvin had made in prior years. The evidence was essentially based on tax returns and 
Susan's testimony only. This evidence showed that Marvin had made an average of 
$338,629 per year over the three year period from 2003 to 2005. See R., at. Ex. I ;  Tr., p 
27, LL. 19-23. At no time did Marvin dispute this historical evidence 
The magistrate, however, concluded that: 
"Marvin's gross annual income for child support purposes is derived through 
his salary, commissions and fringe benefits. He IS paid an annual salary of 
$109,080.00. There was no evidence that Marvin is underpaid. He has received 
commissions (year to date) in the amount of $17, 335.00 and projects total 
commissions in 2006 to be $22,599.00. Marvin also uses a company owned vehicle 
for personal use the expense to operate, in 2005, was $8,740.00. Exhibit 19, 
Schedule C. The court finds that Marvin's annual gross income pursuant to the 
Guidelines is $140,339.00." 
If we compare these findings to the evidence offered at trial, we see that Marvin offered 
testimony through thecomptrollerof MS Administrative Services, Inc., to his monthly salary 
of $9,090 per month, Tr., p. 139, LL. 11-20, which translates to $109,080 per year ($9,090 
x 12 = $109,080). See, Tr., p. 70, LL. 20-22. Increasing that salary, Veloz testified, would 
bankrupt Marvin's companies. Tr., p. 139, L. 21 - p. 140, L. 20, p. 143, LL. 14-24. We also 
see that, at one point in 2006, Marvin had calculated the commission that he had received 
from unrelated companies during that year to amount to $17,335, R., at Ex. 65, Tr., p. 35, 
L. 1 - p. 36, L. 18, and that he projected these commissions through the end of the year 
to be $22,598. Tr., p. 86, LL. 22-23. We also see that Douglas Roberts, Marvin's personal 
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accountant, testified to deductions for automobile expenses of $8,740. R., at Ex. 19, 
Schedule C; Tr., p. 83, LL. 3-23. It is obvious, therefore, that each detail of the 
magistrate's findings was supported by competent and substantial evidence. 
Extensive testimony was offered through Marvin and Fernando Veloz regarding the 
reasons why Marvin's current income in 2006 was less than the historical income 
demonstrated by Susan's evidence. This evidence showed a combination of a decrease 
in income due to lost business accounts, Tr., p. 77, L. 23 - p. 79, L. 14; p. 137, L. 14 - p. 
138, L. 15, and of increased expenses for servicing the debt on a building constructed in 
anticipation of an expansion of his companies by taking advantage of Susan's talents by 
adding a human resource capabilities to the services provided by his companies. Tr., p. 
727, L. 5 - p. 133, L. 19. Susan offered no evidence to rebut the testimony of Marvin's 
witnesses. Tr., p. 190, LL. 2-3. See R., p. 43. 
The magistrate was therefore presented with two undisputed views of Marvin's 
income. The first (Susan's) was based on historical and outdated information, and the 
second (Marvin's) was based upon Marvin's present circumstances and current financial 
data explained by Marvin and his two accountants. The magistrate accepted the evidence 
from Marvin and his accountants. R., p. 43. As shown above, every detail of the 
magistrate's calculations of Marvin's income for child support purposes is supported by the 
record. See R., p. 44. It is the job of the magistrate, not that of an appellate court, to 
weigh the conflicting evidence. In re Williams, 135 ldaho 452, 19 P.3d 766 (2001); Rankin 
V. Rankin, 107 Idaho 621,691 P.2d 1236 (1984). 
Intuitively, it is hard to argue with the proposition that Marvin's present obligation for 
child support should be based upon his current income, without regard to what he had 
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earned in the past. It was clearly rational and reasonable for the magistrate to adopt that 
approach in his findings and conclusions. Given that approach and the fact that each 
detail of his findings was supported by competent and substantial evidence, the award of 
child support in this case can hardly be characterized as a "manifest abuse of discretion". 
Henderson v. Smith, supra; Ross v. Ross, supra. The award of child support at issue in 
this case should therefore be affirmed on appeal. 
Ill. The Magistrate Properly Considered All Factual 
Circumstances Before Him 
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court correctly noted that the major 
difference between the historical data presented by Susan and the current data presented 
by Marvin was the result of the debt on the building constructed by Marvin, which was 
consuming the commissions that had previously been distributed by MST by the 
community as disposable income. R, p. 68. 
The district court continued to note, also correctly, that before Marvin's companies 
took possession of the new building, those companies were paying significantly less for 
office space than they were now paying to service the large mortgage on the new building. 
The district court also correctly noted that Marvin's companies were paying the entire cost 
of the new building even though they were only using a part of the space in that structure, 
because the remainder of the space had not been leased out to others. R, p. 69. 
From there, the district court opined that the magistrate had failed to consider the 
issue of whether it was reasonable or necessary to impose the new level of occupancy 
expense upon Marvin's businesses: 
"To the extent that the amount was not reasonable and necessary to the generation 
of income from the business entities, then the excess amount was money that was 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 26 
going to enhance the husband's separate property interests. In connection with 
child support calculations, this excess would appear to equate to "rent" from 
separate property interests, and should be included in the calculation of the 
husband's resources for child support purposes -even though it might appear that 
the money was being applied to the mortgage debt." 
R, p.70. The district court then concluded with the following paragraph: 
"The money that is equivalent to the reasonable business occupancy 
expense of the business being operated by the husband out of the space, and 
which is being paid over to a third party in the form of interest on the mortgage, is 
an adjustment to the husband's income level before the consideration of child 
support. However, money being paid in excess of that reasonable to the business, 
or which reduces the debt and enhances the husband's separate property interest, 
should be attributable to the husband's separate property interest in the realty and 
should not be applied to reduce his income for purposes of chid support 
determination. In this case, there is not an analysis or finding on how much of the 
money attributable tot he occupancy expense of the new building was within the 
definition of reasonable and ordinary business expense and the business 
operations, and how much was attributable to enhancement of the husband's 
separate property interests. The amounts may be significant, and require a reversal 
to reconsider the issue." 
The district court's conclusions are flawed by two conceptual mistakes and the 
practical evidentiary failure by Susan to introduce evidence that would allow the kind of 
analysis contemplated by the district court in its decision. 
The first conceptual flaw in the district court's opinion is the focus placed by the 
court on the issue of whether it was reasonable to charge Marvin's businesses with the 
cost of paying for the space in the new building that was intended for lease to third parties. 
Implicit in the district court's analysis was the premise that, if the "extra" space was not 
needed by Marvin's companies, it might be unfair to charge them with that space in 
calculating Marvin's income for child support purposes. 
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This is a flaw in the district court's reasoning, because it is Marvin's income that is 
important for child support purposes, not that of any of his companies. That Marvin 
chooses to do business in the form of corporations or limited liability companies, as 
opposed to sole proprietorships, is irrelevant to the calculation of child support in the 
absence of proof that the use of the business entities distorted the flow of income that 
would otherwise come to Marvin. In this case, Susan offered no evidence to show that the 
structure of Marvin's business entities distorted the flow of cash to Marvin, and Marvin 
offered affirmative evidence from his accountant, Douglas Roberts, that the corporate 
structure did not, in fact, make any difference in the flow of cash. Tr., p. 181, LL. 9-16. 
Therefore, whether it is fair to MS or MST to bear the cost of the "extra" space is not 
important to this case unless Susan proved that charging those entities with that cost ..,. 
unfairly reduced Marvin's income. There is no such proof in the record. 
Moreover, assume for the moment that Marvin's companies had not been charged 
with that cost. As explained by Veloz, Marvin himself would then have to pay the debt. Tr., 
p. 139, L. 21 - p. 140, L. 20. Thus, that expense would still be a factor in the determination 
of Marvin's income for child support purposes. The bottom line income to Marvin would 
be the same in any event. Hence, the magistrate fully and accurately calculated Marvin's 
income. 
There is no rule of law that allows one party (Susan), to assert that, when the other 
party (Marvin) has three business activities, two of which are profitable and one of which 
is not, (1) child support should be calculated only on the basis of the two activities that 
generate income and (2) that the losses generated by the third activity should be ignored. 
Instead, child support is calculated on the basis of the net profits and losses of all 
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business activities in question. A failure to consider all of the financial circumstances of 
the party paying child support would itself be an abuse of discretion for failure to consider 
all relevant factual circumstances. See Rohr v. Rohr, supra; Margairaz v. Siegel, supra. 
The second conceptual flaw in the district court's reasoning was the emphasis that 
he placed on the enhancement of Marvin's separate property interests by the money paid 
by MS Administrative Services and MST Insurance Agency for the space that they did not 
need for the generation of income. After the divorce, there would be no community estate 
and therefore all of Marvin's income and property would be separate property interests. 
In any event, the classification of his income as separate or community is irrelevant to the 
calculation of child support, which turns on the amount of income rather than the type of 
income. 
Similarly, that Marvin uses his income to pay a debt that was his separate debt as 
opposed to a community debt is likewise immaterial. After the divorce, all of Marvin's debt 
was his separate obligations. The issue is not whether the debt was separate or 
community; instead, the only issue was whether it was a legitimate business debt. The 
magistrate concluded that it was legitimate debt not used to conceal income. R, p. 43. 
That is the only issue of relevance to the child support inquiry, and the magistrate squarely 
and completely analyzed it. As indicated above, it was the magistrate's job, not that of the 
district court, to evaluate the conflicting evidence. In re Williams, supra; Rankin v. Rankin, 
supra. 
The district court, however, continued by asserting that, to the extent that the 
payments on the deed of trust reduced debt, as opposed to paying interest or insurance, 
it was chargeable to Marvin as income. Even if that conclusion is accepted as true, there 
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is no evidence in the record that would permit the magistrate to calculate to the extent to 
which the payments on the deed of trust were for anything other than interest. That this 
issue was never analyzed by the magistrate is directly attributable to the fact that Susan 
never presented any proof on that issue. Appellate review is properly limited to the 
evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below. Obenchain v. McAlvain 
Construction, lnc., 143 ldaho 56, 137 P.3d 443 (2006). Parties are held to the theory as 
to which they tried the action to the trial court, and issues not raised at trial cannot be first 
presented on appeal. Cox v. Cox, 84 ldaho 513, 373 P.2d 929 (1962). 
In this case, Susan tried the case on historical evidence indicating Marvin's income, 
implicitly denying that any portion of the payments on the debt on the new building were 
properly considered as business expenses. Marvin alleged and proved to the magistrate's- 
satisfaction that these payments were legitimate business expenses. In its Memorandum 
Decision, the district court attempted to fashion a compromise to the effect that some of 
the payments on the debt were legitimate business expenses for child support purposes 
while others were not. This theorywas not tried to the magistrate and no proof was offered 
in support of that theory. The district court erred therefore in raising the issue on appeal, 
because the magistrate was never given the chance to rule on that issue at trial. The 
magistrate fully analyzed the evidence before him on the theories presented to him. He 
cannot be faulted for failing to decide issues on which no evidence was presented to him 
and which were never argued to him. 
IV. Susan is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees 
The magistrate's findings of fact regarding the issue of attorney fees were not 
challenged on appeal. The district court, in its Memorandum Decision, articulated no basis 
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- 
for an award of attorney fees to Susan. Marvin incorporates by reference into this brief the 
magistrate's analysis of the attorney fee issue. R., pp. 41 - 42. That analysis properly 
recognized the issue as one requiring the magistrate to exercise his discretion. He 
exercised that discretion by denying such fees in this case. Based on the evidence before 
him, no one can seriously contend that his decision was an abuse of discretion, and his 
decision to deny those fees should be upheld. 
V. Marvin is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant 
to ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 
of  the ldaho Appellate Rules 
Attorney fees on appeal are awardable under ldaho Code Section 22-12? and Rule 
41 of the ldaho Appellate Rules if an appeal does no more than invite an appellate court 
to second-guess the trial court in deciding evidentiary issues Leffunich v. Letfunich, 141 
ldaho 425, 11 1 P.3d (2005); Johnson v. Edwards, 113 ldaho 660, 747 P.2d 69 (1987). 
Despite her attempts to disguise her appeal as one raising legal issues, Susan's notice of 
appeal clearly admits her intent in the statement of issues. Her first issue was whether the 
magistrate erred by ignoring or misconstruing evidence, and her second issue was whether 
the magistrate failed carefully to review Marvin's income and expenses. This is nothing 
more than a request that the appellate courts second-guess the magistrate's findings 
In this appeal, Susan has done nothing more than reiterate her claim at trial that the 
payment of funds by MS Administrative Services and MST Insurance Agency to Montoya 
Enterprises to pay the debt on the new building was an illegitimate attempt by Marvin to 
understate his income for child support purposes. Tr., p. 28, LL. 9-24; p. 35, LL. 12-17. 
The magistrate expressly rejected her argument, R, p. 43, and the district court erred, for 
the reasons explained above, in accepting it, even in part. 
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Susan has implicitly argued that the payments to Montoya Enterprises are part of 
- 
a "shell game" in which income appears and disappears without cause. Her argument 
overlooks the express, undisputed testimony that the income to, and expressly paid by, 
Montoya Enterprises is shown on Marvin's personal tax returns. T., p. 77, L. 9 - p. 179, L. 
20. Thus, any money paid to Montoya Enterprises as opposed to Montoya himself 
ultimately showed upon on Marvin's tax returns anyway. Therefore, as a practical matter, 
for purposes of calculating Marvin's income after payment of all legitimate business 
expenses, it made no difference that MS Administrative Services and MST Insurance 
Agency paid Montoya Enterprises rather than Montoya himself. Therefore, there was no 
shell game, and the magistrate's conclusions, based on the record before him, were 
absolutely correct. 
The appeal by Susan was simply a gambit aimed at inducing an appellate court to 
second-guess the magistrate. That the district court accepted the gambit by second- 
guessing the magistrate as he did does not change the nature of Susan's appeal. Since 
the magistrate was correct, attorney fees should be awarded on appeal pursuant to ldaho 
Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the magistrate's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order and the resulting judgment in all respects. It should also award Montoya the 
attorney fees incurred on appeal pursuant to ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 of 
the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
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